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CASENOTES 
Constitutional Law-CIVIL PROCEDUREIMPLIED CAUSE OF 
ACTION- EXTENDING BIVENS TO THE FIFTH AMENDMENT-DUU~S 
u. Passman, 442 US. 228 (1979) 
Shirley Davis was employed by Congressman Otto Passman 
of Louisiana as his deputy administrative assistant from Febru- 
ary 1 to July 31 of 1974. On July 31, Passman terminated Davis' 
employment, stating in a letter to her that although she was 
"able, energetic, and a very hard worker . . . it was essential 
that the understudy to my Administrative Assistant be a man."' 
Davis brought suit against Passman in federal district court, 
claiming federal jurisdiction through the federal question provi- 
sions of 28 U.S.C. 1331(a)."he charged that Congressman 
Passman's gender-based employment decision discriminated 
against her in violation of the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment. Adopting the rationale of Bivens u. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of  narcotic^,^ Davis 
claimed that a cause of action implied from the due process 
clause gave her a right to a damages remedy to compensate for 
this violation of her fifth amendment rights.' 
The U.S. District Court of Louisiana dismissed the suit, de- 
claring that no private right of action existed directly from the 
fifth amendment in the absence of congressional authorization.' 
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, two hearings 
were held. A panel of the appeals court reversed the district 
court's dismissal: but the rehearing en banc upheld the district 
court's conclusion that a private right of action could not be im- 
plied from the fifth amendment in this situation.? Because a ma- 
1. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 n.3 (1979). 
2. 28 U.S.C. 5 1331(a) (1976) provides that "district courts shall have original juris- 
diction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Consti- 
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens the Supreme Court implied a cause of action di- 
rectly from the fourth amendment. 
4. Brief for Petitioner a t  7, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
5. See Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 
6. Davis v. Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977), reu'd on rehearing en banc, 571 
F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
7. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), reu'd, 442 U.S. 228 
166 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
jority of the circuit courts of appeal had either implied causes of 
action from other provisions of the Constitution, or had indi- 
cated a willingness to extend the Bivens doctrine beyond the 
fourth amendment: the Supreme Court agreed to review Davis 
v. Passman to resolve the question. 
A. Gaps in Statutory Authorization for a Damages Remedy 
Davis was forced to rely on a cause of action implied from 
the fifth amendment to redress her grievance because she had no 
statutory grounds for seeking damages relief.e Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 19641° prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex in employment practices,ll but the original enactment 
(1979). 
8. The First Circuit was the only circuit court of appeals that had failed to extend 
the Bivens implication doctrine to constitutional guarantees other than those of the 
fourth amendment. See Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37,42-44 (1st Cir. 1977) (municipality 
vicariously liable under the fourteenth amendment). The remaining circuit courts have 
found Bivens-type actions in various constitutional settings or have been sympathetic to 
an extension of the Bivens doctrine. See Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291,1294 (4th Cir. 
1978), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Moffit v. Loe, 48 U.S.L.W. 3077 (U.S. Feb. 13, 
1979) (No. 78-1260) (fifth amendment); Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 
1978), cert. granted, 442 U.S. 940 (1979) (Bivens should apply to any constitutional guar- 
antee when appropriate); Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193,196 (2d Cir. 1977) (fourteenth 
amendment); Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932-33 (8th Cir. 1977), va- 
cated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), modified, 589 F.2d 335 (1978), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 42 
(1979) (fourteenth amendment); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 
928,942 (9th Cir. 1977), modified on other grounds, 566 F.2d 1353, 1364 (9th Cir. 1979), 
modified on other grounds sub nom. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Plan- 
ning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (fifth amendment); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 
194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) (first amendment); Paton v. 
LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 869-70 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment); Cox v. Stanton, 529 
F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975) (sympathetic to claim under the thirteenth and fourteenth 
amendments); Yiamouyiannis v. Chemical Abstracts Sew., 521 F.2d 1392, 1392 (6th Cir. 
1975), aff'd on remand, 578 F.2d 164 (1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 
(1978) (first amendment); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 931-32 
(10th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (Bivens not limited to the fourth amendment); Wounded Knee 
Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (injunctive 
relief for sixth amendment violation). See also Comment, Constitutionally Implied 
Causes of Action: A Policy of Protection, Expansion, or Restriction?, 30 MERCER L. REV. 
1023, 1027-31 (1979). 
9. Davis originally sought equitable relief in the form of reinstatement and specific 
relief in addition to damages. However, Congressman Passman was defeated in the 1976 
primary election, 422 U.S. a t  230 n.1, so these other forms of relief were no longer availa- 
ble. Consequently, the suit was narrowed to a request for damages. Id. a t  231 n.4. 
10. 42 U.S.C. 33 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). 
11. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e-2(a) (1976) provides that "[ilt shall be an unlawful employ- 
ment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such indi- 
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covered only certain private sector employees and not federal 
employees.12 Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
of 1972 extended coverage of Title VII to most federal en- 
ployees,13 congressional staff employees not governed by compet- 
itive service regulations were left outside its protective 
umbrella.14 
Davis was unable to base her suit on the federal statute 
granting a private cause of action to parties deprived of their 
constitutional rights under color of state law,16 since this act 
does not extend to constitutional violations committed by fed- 
eral officials like Congressman Passman. Nor did Davis have a 
cause of action under Louisiana law? Even if she had, a state 
court would arguably have lacked the authority to award a dam- 
ages remedy against a federal c~ngressman.'~ Consequently, Da- 
vis' only possibility for relief rested on judicial extension of the 
Bivens doctrine to the fifth amendment. 
B. The Implied Constitutional Cause of Action Doctrine 
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for the creation of 
implied constitutional causes of action in Bell v. Hood.18 The 
district court in Bell had dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction a money damages suit against federal officers who 
had allegedly violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. This 
was done because the remedy had not been authorized by Con- 
gress or the Constitution. In reversing this holding, the Supreme 
Court stated that when a deprivation of constitutional rights 
vidual's . . . sex." 
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, Title VII, 5 701,78 Stat. 253 (1964) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)) ("The term 'employer' . . . does not include (1) the 
United States . . . . "). 
13. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 8 11, 86 Stat. 111 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-16 
(1976)). This legislation provided that "[alll personnel actions affecting employees . . . 
in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having 
positions in the competitive service . . . shall be made free from any discrimination 
based on . . . sex." 
14. Congressional st& employees are not hired under the competitive service, so 
they are not protected by Title VII. See 442 US. a t  247 & n.26. The competitive service 
is defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1976). Congressional st& personnel decisions are gov- 
erned by 2 U.S.C. § 92 (1976), which provides "[tlhat such persons shall be subject to 
removal at any time by such Member [of Congress] . . . with or without cause." 
15. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1976). 
16. 422 US. a t  245 n.23. 
17. Id. 
18. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
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was alleged, federal jurisdiction was conferred by the federal 
question jurisdiction statute, which authorized suits "aris(ing1 
under the Constit~tion."'~ The defense of the nonavailability of 
money damages was based on a failure to state a claim for relief, 
an issue that could be raised only after jurisdiction was exer- 
cised. As to whether or not relief could be granted to the Bell 
plaintiffs, the Court observed in dictum that "where federally 
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from 
the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies 
so as to grant the necessary relief."20 
The authoritative ruling on the discretionary ability of fed- 
eral courts to award judicially-authorized damages came twenty- 
five years later in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics." In Bivens, federal narcotics 
agents entered and searched Bivens' apartment without a search 
warrant and arrested him without probable cause. The Supreme 
Court held that there was a federal cause of action arising di- 
rectly out of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasona- 
ble searches and seizures.22 The Court, disclaiming any need for 
statutory authorization to award a remedy, fashioned a federal 
common law money damages remedy from the implied authority 
of the Constitution itself? Writing for the majority, Justice 
Brennan found "no special factors counselling hesitation [in 
granting a remedy] in the absence of affirmative action by Con- 
gress."" He emphasized that relegating Bivens to alternative 
state law remedies would be inadequate, since the interests pro- 
tected by those state remedies were not as extensive as, and in 
some cases even conflicted with, the interests protected by the 
fourth amendment? 
Justice Harlan, concurring, also concluded that federal 
courts do not need specific congressional permission to create 
remedies for constitutional ~iolat ions.~ Harlan argued that fed- 
eral courts had previously used the general jurisdictional grant 
of 28 U.S.C. 5 1331(a)" as authority to grant equitable relief to 
Id. at 682-85. The current version of this statute is at 28 U.S.C. 5 1331(a) (1976). 
Id. at 684. 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
Id. at 397. 
Id. 
Id. at 396. 
Id. at 394-95. 
Id. at 399 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
See note 2 supra. 
1651 CASENOTE 169 
plaintiffs asserting constitutional violations. He could see no log- 
ical reason why this power should not also extend to awarding 
traditional legal remedies like damages.28 
Harlan also required a separate determination that the 
"compensatory relief is 'necessary' or 'appropriate' to the vindi- 
cation of the interest asserted."2e Therefore, judicial considera- 
tion of policy factors equal in scope to those examined by a leg- 
islative body enacting a statutory remedy was necessary to meet 
Harlan's test?* Finally, however, the lack of viable alternatives 
to a federal damages remedy for Bivens necessitated a vindica- 
tion of his fourth amendment rights; for people in Bivens' posi- 
tion it was "damages or n~thing."~' 
In 1978 the Fifth Circuit concluded in Davis u. Passrnan 
that it should not extend the Bivens logic beyond the narrow 
confines of the fourth amendment to the more nebulous causes 
of action that could arise from the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment.s2 After determining that the remedy in Bivens was 
partially derived from federal common law sources and not man- 
dated exclusively by the Constitution, the court applied the Cort 
v. Ashm criteria for implying statutory causes of action to the 
Davis facts. It concluded that a private right of action was not 
so compelling as to "countermand the clearly discernible will of 
Congress [by creating] a cause of action where Congress declined 
to provide one."s4 
- - 
28. 403 US. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
29. Id. at 407. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 410. 
32. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 801 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), reu'g Davis v. 
Passman, 544 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1977). See 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 137 (1977) for com- 
ments on the prior panel decision. 
33. 422 US. 66 (1975). The Cort criteria for determining if a private cause of action 
should be implied from a statutory scheme of relief are the following: 
First . . . does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Sec- 
Id. 
ond, is there any indication of legislative incnt, explicit or implicit, either to 
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underly- 
ing purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? 
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law . . . 
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on 
federal law? 
.t 78. 
3'4. 571 F.2d at 800. 
170 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I980 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit 
with a five to four decision and decreed that the Cort criteria do 
not apply to constitutional guarantees. The Court held that Da- 
vis, who suffered a deprivation of her due process rights by fed- 
eral action, had a right to an implied cause of action from the 
fifth amendment,l15 with a damages remedy to redress her 
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Brennan reasoned 
that the "implied" equal protection component of the fifth 
amendment gave Davis a right to be protected from gender dis- 
crimination by her congressional employer if the discrimination 
did not serve "important government obje~tives."~~ To Brennan 
"the question whether a litigant has a 'cause of action' [was] an- 
alytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, 
a litigant may be entitled to receive;"38 therefore, he adopted 
Justice Harlan's viewpoint in Bivens and separated his consider- 
ation of the issues concerning (1) the existence of a cause of ac- 
tion, and (2) the plaintiffs right to judicial relief. 
A. Cause of Action 
Brennan characterized a "cause of action" as the judicial 
determination of whether a plaintiff belonged to a class of po- 
tential litigants who could, as a matter of law, enforce certain 
rights? He asserted that the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that Da- 
vis could not judicially enforce her due process rights in a pri- 
vate action failed to recognize that constitutional rights and 
statutory rights are derived from different sources. It is essential 
to find legislative intent to allow a private cause of action when 
statutory rights are involved, since those rights are derived from 
congressional action. However, the judicial branch has the pri- 
mary responsibility of enforcing rights derived directly from the 
Constitution; therefore, where constitutional rights are involved, 
the Cort legislative intent requirements are not appli~able.'~ 
Victims of federal discriminatory practices with no practical 
means to otherwise secure their constitutional rights must be 
able to use the federal courts to protect those interests; other- 
35. 442 U.S. at 244. 
36. Id. at 248. 
37. Id. at 234 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). 
38. 442 U.S. at 239. 
39. Id. at 239 11.18. 
40. Id. at 241-42. 
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wise, their rights would be meaningless." Therefore, Davis had a 
right to a federal cause of action to enforce her fifth amendment 
rights, even though Congress had not expressly or impliedly au- 
thorized a private suit. 
B. Appropriateness of the Remedy 
Although Davis had a right to a cause of action, Justice 
Brennan still found it necessary to examine the appropriateness 
of the damages remedy she requested. He believed that the Fifth 
Circuit erred in emphasizing congressional failure to provide a 
remedy for congressional employees threatened by employment 
discrimination. Brennan reasoned that Congress did not intend 
to preclude alternative judicial remedies for violation of the con- 
stitutional rights of congressional employees by failing to extend 
coverage of Title VII to them. He found that the rights of con- 
gressional employees to certain remedies for constitutional viola- 
tions existed before the Civil Rights Act was passed, since these 
rights were grounded in the Constitution itself. Therefore, a 
statutory scheme that bypassed those employees did not affect 
their preexisting constitutional remedies.'$ Finding that manage- 
ability and the unavailability of alternative relief made a dam- 
ages remedy proper," the Court decided that the federal judici- 
ary was justified in extending the Bivens doctrine to imply a 
damages remedy under the fifth amendment. 
The majority opinion aroused three vigorous  dissent^.^' 
Chief Justice Burger insisted from a separation of powers view- 
point that congressmen needed complete discretion in employ- 
ment decisions, since loyal staffs are essential to the perform- 
ance of their legislative duties; therefore, he concluded, "until 
Congress legislates otherwise as to employment standards for its 
own staffs, judicial power in this area is circ~mscribed."~~ 
Justice Stewart objected to the Court's decision to bypass 
the speech or debate clause4@ immunity issue by remanding it for 
41. Id. at 242. 
42. Id. at 247. 
43. Id. at 245-48. 
44. Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice Powell wrote separate dissent- 
ing opinions. Justice Rehnquist joined all three dissents. Justice Powell and the Chief 
Justice joined each other's opinion. 
45. 442 U.S. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 6. "[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Sena- 
tors and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." 
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consideration by the trial court as a factor that might "counsel 
hesitation" in granting a remedy. He felt that immunity was "a 
preliminary question that may be completely dispositive [of the 
case] . . . regardless of the abstract existence of a cause of ac- 
tion or a damages remedy."47 
Justice Powell appealed for discretion by federal courts 
when implying a cause of action directly from the Constitution. 
Among the policy factors that Powell felt the Court had ignored 
in exercising that discretion was comity or respect for an equal 
branch of g~vernment .~~ Since Congress "took pains to exempt 
itself from the coverage of Title VII,"4s Powell believed that the 
Court recklessly disregarded the desire of Congress to preclude 
judicial examination of its employment decisions. 
Davis is significant in terms of constitutional theory not 
only because it extends the Bivens rationale beyond the fourth 
amendment context, but also because it explores the reasons for 
implying constitutional causes of action." Despite fears that the 
Court would restrict the constitutional cause of action theory?l 
Davis reinforced Bivens by applying its logic to the due process 
clause. Moreover, the Court adopted Justice Harlan's reasoning 
in Bivens and clarified some of the gaps in the Bivens logic. 
The Fifth Circuit was disturbed by the lack of concrete 
guidelines in Bivene2 therefore, the court's opinion in Davis at- 
47. 442 U.S. at 251 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. a t  254. 
50. The Supreme Court allowed the lower federal courts to wrestle with the exten- 
sion of the Bivens rationale to other constitutional issues during the eight year period 
between Biuens and Davis by reserving the question for future consideration. See Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 n.8 (1978); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1977); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 4 n.3 (1976). 
51. Lehman, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause of Ac- 
tion for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 531, 603-04 
(1977). Surprisingly, the controversy in Davis centered on the appropriate use of the 
doctrine of constitutional causes of action and not on the validity of the doctrine. "[Ilt 
has been clear . . . that in appropriate circumstances private causes of action may be 
inferred from provisions of the Constitution." 442 U.S. at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
52. Because the Fifth Circuit felt it could not formulate "acceptable limits on the 
right of action Davis would have us imply," the court refused to extend Bivens to a 
complaint founded on the fifth amendment "until the Supreme Court answers the open 
question of whether any such right should exist." 571 F.2d a t  801. The commentators 
have also been disturbed by the lack of guidelines for application of the Bivens doctrine: 
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tempted to formulate manageable standards for determining 
when implication of a constitutional cause of action is war- 
ranted. Although the Supreme Court repudiated the Fifth Cir- 
cuit's use of the Cort criteria, Davis does not signal a complete 
abandonment of all barriers in suits alleging violations of consti- 
tutional interests by federal action. Instead, the Court reiterated 
the Biuens principle that the implication of a constitutional 
cause of action is not obligatory, but lies within the court's dis- 
cretion. Justice Brennan identified four major hurdles that con- 
ceivably could prevent favorable judicial action for a constitu- 
tional cause of action suit: jurisdiction, standing, cause of action, 
and relief? 
Jurisdiction guidelines were established in Bell v. Hood,64 
which declared that there was subject matter jurisdiction in 
cases alleging constitutional violations, unless the claim "clearly 
appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of ob- 
taining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial 
and f r i v o l ~ u s . " ~ ~ n  addition, Davis had "alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the ~ontroversy"~~ to ensure sufficient 
standing to bring her suit in federal court. The controversy in 
Davis arose over the cause of action and relief issues. Although 
Justice Brennan's attempt to analytically separate these two is- 
sues served his immediate purposes, it also introduced a new 
source of confusion about the reach of the doctrine of implied 
constitutional causes of action. 
A. Existence of a Cause of Action 
When a constitutional violation is alleged, Davis asserts that 
a court must consider whether a right to bring a private suit to 
enforce constitutional guarantees stems directly from the Con- 
stitution itself, absent congressional authorization. Because she 
"[A]lthough [Biuens] provides the federal courts with a potentially powerful tool, there 
is very little instruction on how or when it is to be used." Dellinger, Of Rights and Reme- 
dies: The Constitution As a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1543 (1972). Also see id. at 
1544, which suggests that Bivens might be limited to remedies that have "traditionally 
been available in the federal courts for other constitutionally based actions." 
53. 442 U.S. at 239 n.18. Other obstacles that plaintiffs have encountered with Biu- 
ens-type actions are outside the scope of this note. However, they are discussed in Note, 
"Damages or Nothing9'-The Efficacy of the Bivens-type Remedy, 64 CORNELL . REV. 
667 (1979). 
54. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra. 
55. 327 U.S. at 682-83. 
56. 442 U.S. at 239 n.18 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). 
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had no effective alternative means of protection, Davis had a 
right to "invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the 
protection of [her] justiciable constitutional rights."" Davis re- 
inforced the Harlan view in Bivens that the federal question ju- 
risdiction statutew impliedly authorized the judicial branch, not 
Congress, to decide which litigants may properly demand the 
use of the enforcement mechanism of the courts when constitu- 
tional rights are involved." 
However, this judicial power is not unlimited. In both Davis 
and Bivens the Court emphasized that any alternative state tort 
actions were either inadequate or nonexistent. Implying a consti- 
tutional cause of action was particularly compelling in both 
cases, because without federal judicial intervention the plain- 
tiffs' constitutional rights would be unenforceable. Where an ac- 
tion under state law or other appropriate means of protection 
are available to preserve an aggrieved party's interests, federal 
courts would be less justified in implying a right to bring suit. 
B. Appropriateness of the Remedy 
The issue most carefully scrutinized in both Davis and Biv- 
ens was the appropriateness of the remedy fashioned by the 
Court. In Bivens, Justice Brennan outlined three areas of con- 
cern: (1) whether the circumstances involved in the case would 
make awarding damages appr~priate;'~ (2) whether there were 
any "special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of af- 
firmative action by Congre~s;"~~ and (3) whether there was an 
"explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a fed- 
eral officer's violation of [constitutional guarantees] may not re- 
cover money damages . . . , but must instead be remitted to an- 
other remedy, equally effective in the view of C~ngress."'~ 
Brennan explained in Davis that "[a]lthough [Davis] has a cause 
of action, her complaint might nevertheless be dismissed under 
Rule 12(b)(6) unless it can be determined that judicial relief is 
a~ailable."'~ Under Brennan's analysis, if a damages remedy had 
57. Id.  at 242. 
58. See note 2 and accompanying text supra. 
59. Compare 442 U.S. at 242-45 with 403 U.S. at 405 (Harlan, J., concurring). See 
also Dellinger, supra note 52, at 1542-43. 
60. 403 U.S. at 395-96. 
61. Id. at 396. 
62. Id. at 397. 
63. 442 U.S. at 244. 
1651 CASENOTE 175 
not been a proper form of relief, a dismissal for "failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be grantedwe4 would have been in 
order, even though a cause of action existed. 
I .  General appropriateness of the circumstances 
In Davis, Justice Brennan justified the propriety of author- 
izing a damages remedy by listing the factors supporting the 
grant of that remedy. These factors were: (1) the historic use of 
damages as the "ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal in- 
terests in liberty,"65 (2) the judicial manageability of awarding 
damages when there were no "difficult questions of valuation or 
causation,"66 due to the extensive experience of federal courts 
with similar Title VII damages awards, and (3) the lack of equi- 
table relief or other alternative remedies for Davis?' 
By analyzing these factors, Brennan implicitly abandoned 
his sweeping generalization in Bivens that as long as a constitu- 
tional cause of action could be implied, it was logical for a court 
to "use any available remedy to make good the wrong done'w8 in 
order to protect federally-guaranteed rights. Instead, Brennan 
followed the Harlan position in Bivens that an extensive analysis 
of policy considerations was required before a judicially-author- 
ized remedy could be created. 
Justice Harlan had claimed that "the range of policy consid- 
erations [the Court] may take into account is at least as broad as 
the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an 
express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy."e9 
Among the factors considered by Harlan were the qualifications 
of the federal courts to deal with the questions raised by the 
constitutional claim,1° the limitations on state damages reme- 
dies, the desirability of assessing damages claims against federal 
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
65. 442 U.S. a t  245 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. a t  395). 
66. 442 U.S. a t  245. 
67. Id. 
68. 403 U.S. a t  396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684). 
69. 403 U.S. a t  407 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
70. Id. at 408-09. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978). In Butz, 
Justice White addressed the Bivens problem in dictum and admonished that "[albsent 
congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think more carefully about 
whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages 
. . . and whether the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the 
plaintiffs claim" (citations omitted). 
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officials according to uniform federal standards, and the pres- 
sures on judicial branch resources from an overburdened 
caseload.?l 
A question left unanswered by Davis is whether it is appro- 
priate to imply a cause of action to protect all constitutional in- 
terests. The Court's analysis in Davis suggests that even if the 
nature of the constitutional guarantee being asserted gives rise 
to a cause of action, appropriateness problems could result in 
the denial of a remedy for that guarantee. Consequently, the im- 
plication of constitutional causes of action by lower federal 
courts under the first," sixth,?= eighth,?' thirteenth,l%d four- 
teenth amendments76 will be validated only when the requested 
remedy is warranted under the Davis criteria. 
Davis, therefore, a r m s  Harlan's suggestion that, in the ab- 
sence of congressional authority, federal courts weigh the rele- 
vant policy issues before granting relief under an implied cause 
of action. Implication of a cause of action in the context of one 
constitutional guarantee does not necessarily justify the implica- 
tion of a cause of action in the context of another.77 The breadth 
of the judiciary's discretion and the proper time for its invoca- 
tion are still in question.78 
71. 403 U.S. at 410. (Harlan, J., concurring). 
72. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
438 U.S. 916 (1978); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862,869-70 (3d Cir. 1975); Yiamouyian- 
nis v. Chemical Abstracts Sew., 521 F.2d 1392,1392 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd on remand, 578 
F.2d 164 (1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). 
73. See, e.g., Wounded Knee Legal DefenseIOffense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 
1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (injunctive relief for sixth amendment violation). 
74. See, e.g., Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp. 737, 739-40 (E.D. Ill. 1975). 
75. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975) (sympathetic to claim 
under the thirteenth amendment). 
76. See, e.g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1977). 
77. See 403 U.S. a t  409 n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
78. The commentators have suggested other approaches in determining the appro- 
priateness of a requested remedy. Professor Dellinger has suggested that 
[a]s a prerequisite to supplying a remedy, the court must first determine that 
the implicated constitutional provision provides substantive protection to one 
in the position of the plaintiff. The focus should then be upon whether there 
are other remedies available to those in the plaintiffs position that would as 
fully effectuate the purpose of the constitutional guarantee as the remedy 
sought. 
Dellinger, supra note 52, at  1551. Other suggestions include use of the traditional "legis- 
latively defined standards of conduct" to guide the courts in determining if a particular 
alleged tort will be recognized. Note, Remedies for Constitutional Torts: "Special Fac- 
tors Counselling Hesitation," 9 IND. L. REV. 441, 445 (1976), [hereinafter cited as 
Remedies]. 
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2. Special factors counselling hesitation 
Justice Brennan boldly proceeded to fashion a damages 
remedy in Bivens because there were "no special factors counsel- 
ling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Con- 
g e ~ ~ . " ' ~  Brennan faced a different situation in Dauis: the scope 
of speech or debate clause immunity in a suit against a congress- 
man was clearly a "special factor" counselling hesitation. Bren- 
nan disposed of this dilemma by acknowledging the existence of 
this special factor, and by then concluding that it had no rele- 
vance to the Court's authority to allow Davis to bring a private 
suit against Congressman Pas~rnan.~O The special factors would 
only counsel hesitation in granting a remedy, not hesitation in 
the implication of a constitutional cause of action. There being a 
cause of action, the scope of the immunity for Congressman 
Passman was therefore to be determined by the trial court on 
remand, since that was the appropriate forum for granting a 
remedy.s1 
The Court refused to infer that Congress intended to deny 
Davis a remedy by failing to extend Title VII protections to con- 
gressional employees, since there had been "no explicit congres- 
sional de~laration"~~ of legislative intent. The majority rejected 
vague inferences from congressional inaction as a special factor. 
These special factors must be objective considerations capable of 
careful evaluation by a federal court, they warned, not conve- 
nient excuses for denying a plaintiff relief. 
In Dauis, Justice Brennan has not exhausted the special fac- 
tors that conceivably would counsel hesitation in formulating 
damages remedies in constitutional cause of action cases.88 How- 
ever, his decision to limit the review of special factors to the 
remedy stage hampers the proper consideration of these factors, 
79. 403 U.S. at 396. Special factors that had deterred the Court from implying a 
federal common law remedy in prior cases were not present in Bivens. Those cases in- 
volved: (1) the United States as the plaintiff in a tort action with no specific statutory 
grounds for relief, and (2) attempts to impose liability on congressional employees who 
had exceeded their congressional authority without violating a constitutional prohibition. 
Id. 
80. 442 U.S. a t  235 n.11, 246. 
81. Id. at 235 n.11. 
82. Id. at 246-47 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. a t  397) (emphasis in Dauis). 
83. See Remedies, supra note 78, a t  461-62, for suggestions that "[p]rovisions of the 
Constitution itself" and "specific grants of legislative powers" might counsel hesitation 
in awarding a remedy to a plaintiff. 
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since many of the potential special factors are directly related to 
the issue of whether the plaintiff should have the right to be in 
court with a cause of action. Such factors as the advisability of 
vicarious liability for municipalities,B4 the feasibility of using the 
procedural guidelines developed in section 1983 suits to deter- 
mine whether related constitutional causes of action should be 
allowed,Bs and the extent to which the courts will allow a plain- 
tiff to use a Bivens-type action to circumvent the procedural dif- 
ficulties that attend available statutory causes of actions6 will 
call for continued judicial balancing of the merits of implying 
both a right to judicial action and a right to a particular remedy. 
I t  is difficult to see how the Court can justifiably limit the appli- 
cation of "special factors counselling hesitation" to the remedy 
issue only. 
3. Remittance to an equally effective remedy 
Davis implicitly criticizes Congress' less than exemplary em- 
ployment record and its failure to extend Title VII or other em- 
ployment protections to its own  employee^.^' Davis produced 
"the anomalous result of granting federal employees in noncom- 
petitive positions, whom Congress did not intend to protect, a 
remedy far more extensive than Congress adopted for federal 
employees in the competitive service, whom it did intend to pro- 
t e ~ t . " ~ ~  If Davis had been covered by Title VII, she would have 
been limited under the principles of Brown u. General Services 
84. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 
904 (1978); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37, 42-44 (1st Cir. 1977); Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 
334, 337 (10th Cir. 1976). 
85. The Seventh Circuit noted that "because actions brought under the Civil Rights 
Acts and those of the Biuens-type are conceptually identical and further the same poli- 
cies, courts have frequently looked to the Civil Rights Acts and their decisional gloss for 
guidance in filling the gaps left open in Biuens-type actions." The Court therefore de- 
cided to apply the fj 1983 standards for survivorship of a federal claim after the death of 
a federal prisoner in a Biuens-type case. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 
1978), cert. granted, 442 U.S. 940 (1979). 
86. Professor Dellinger noted that "[tlhe Bivens decision leads to the rather striking 
conclusion that section 1983 may simply be unnecessary: money damages, as well as eq- 
uitable relief, may be obtained in suits founded directly upon the Constitution." Dellin- 
ger, supra note 52, at 1559. 
87. 442 U.S. at 247. See also Comment, The Last Plantation: Will Employment 
Reform Come to Capitol Hill?, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 271 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Last 
Plantation); North, Congress: The Last Plantation, BARRISTER, Fall 1978, at 46; Isbell, 
Congress as 01' Massa, CIV. LIB. REV., Jan./Feb. 1978, at 46. 
88. Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d at 798. 
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Administrations9 to the exclusive administrative remedies au- 
thorized by the Civil Rights Act. Consequently, she would have 
been restricted to bringing suit against her former employer in 
his official capacity if she was dissatisfied with her administra- 
tive rernedies?O 
In Bivens, the Court began making policy judgments on the 
availability of judicial relief for plaintiffs alleging constitutional 
violations. Although the dissenters in Bivens criticized the ma- 
jority's usurpation of legislative functions:' the Court justified 
its actions by paying lip service to the concept of deferring to 
legislative judgment if alternative remedies were provided. Since 
there was "no explicit congressional dec1a;ation that persons in- 
jured . . . may not recover money damages from the agents, but 
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in 
the view of C~ngress , "~~ the Court rationalized that it  could fill 
the gap created by Congress' silence by providing an implied 
remedy. 
In Davis, however, Congress had legislated in the area of 
judicial relief for federal employees and arguably had concluded 
that congressional employees could not recover money damages 
from congressional employers. Bivens initiated a significant in- 
fringement by the judicial branch into the arena of policymak- 
ing; Davis furthered this encroachment by disregarding Con- 
gress' prior action in this area. As Justice Powell warned, 
it would not be surprising for Congress to consider today's ac- 
tion unwarranted and to exercise its authority to reassert the 
proper balance between the legislative and judicial branches. If 
the reaction took the form of limiting the jurisdiction of federal 
courts, the effect conceivably could be to frustrate the vindica- 
tion of rights properly protected by the Co~r t . '~  
89. 425 U.S. 820 (1976). This case held that a federal employee covered by Title VII 
was required to follow the statutory administrative relief scheme set up under Title VII 
as his exclusive remedy. The aggrieved employee was not permitted to bypass the proce- 
dures set up under Title VII by filing a Bivens-type action in federal court after he 
missed a statutory deadline for judicial review. 
90. 571 F.2d at 798 n.lO. The Civil Service Commission has the "authority to en- 
force the provisions of subsection (a) of this section [42 U.S.C. 2000e-161 through appro- 
priate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay 
. . . . " 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-16(b) (1976). The aggrieved federal employee may file a civil 
action against the head of his or her department if he is dissatisfied with the actions 
taken by the Commission. Id. 5 2000e-16(c) (1976). 
91. 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id. a t  428 (Black, J., dissenting). 
92. 403 U.S. at 397. 
93. 442 U.S. a t  255 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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The potential for personal liability of members of Congress 
in the future will undoubtedly motivate Congress to "reform" its 
employment practices.@' However, it is unclear under Davis how 
much leeway Congress will be allowed in structuring an alterna- 
tive relief scheme. Davis implicitly reserved a judicial veto over 
the legislature's right to choose the best alternative for protect- 
ing congressional employees. " [Wlere Congress to create equally 
effective alternative remedies," the Court declared, "the need for 
damages relief might be ~bviated."@~ The Court's use of the 
qualifying word "might" indicates that the judicial branch will 
evaluate the practicality or effectiveness of alternative remedies 
created by Congress and will not merely defer to the judgment 
of the legislat~re.~~ 
The Court probably felt that heightened judicial scrutiny of 
congressionally-enacted alternative remedies was needed, be- 
cause Congress could not be presumed to act fairly and objec- 
tively in providing alternative remedies for congressional em- 
ployees. It is conceivable that an exception to the Brown rule of 
limiting federal employees to alternative statutory relief schemes 
mandated by Congress could be established for congressional 
employees due to the Davis idea that Congress cannot deprive 
its employees of their preexisting implied right to a damages 
remedy by formulating other remedies. Congress may therefore 
have difficulty creating a viable alternative to the personal liabil- 
ity of congressmen that was imposed by Davis. 
C. A Confusing Distinction? 
Justice Brennan's two-step analysis in Davis presents con- 
ceptual and practical difficulties. The focus of the first step of 
the analysis is on the "nature of the right [plaintiff] asserts,"@' 
which determines whether a cause of action will be implied to 
protect that right. As for the second step, if the requested rem- 
edy effectuates the constitutional right being protected, then the 
judiciary is qualified to grant that remedy. 
94. For some suggestions on alternative means of protecting congressional employ- 
ment rights, see Last Plantation, supra note 87, at 304-10 (1979). 
95. 442 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added). 
96. Professor Dellinger agreed with this proposition: "The ultimate determination of 
whether a remedial scheme appropriately effectuates the mandate of the Constitution is, 
of course, to be made by the Court as an exercise of constitutional judicial review." Del- 
linger, supra note 52, at 1548 n.89. 
97. 442 U.S. at 239 n.18. 
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In support of his analysis, Brennan asserted the unique pro- 
position that "[a] plaintiff may have a cause of action even 
though he be entitled to no relief at all."98 This statement, sup- 
portable for declaratory judgments, is of dubious validity for a 
money damages remedy. Adjudicating a constitutionally-implied 
claim when the money damages requested are not available is 
tantamount to an advisory opinion on the merits of the claim. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure link the right to bring a 
claim with the relief the claim is based upon; if the relief is un- 
available, the cause of action it rests on must fail also.s9 Justice 
Brennan's attempt to disregard the linkage between a cause of 
action and its subsequent remedy only confuses the policy issues 
involved with both. 
Brennan's approach effectively narrows the scope of analysis 
of constitutional causes of action and distorts the broad policy 
analysis envisioned by Justice Harlan for these claims. The two- 
step analysis weights the scales in favor of plaintiffs with consti- 
tutional grievances, since narrowing the focus of analysis elimi- 
nates many potential stumbling blocks. However, while favoring 
constitutional plaintiffs, this method of analysis fails to ade- 
quately justify allowing these plaintiffs to use the enforcement 
powers of the courts. 
Justice Powell was convinced that Brennan's zeal to protect 
plaintiffs with constitutional grievances led him to ignore pru- 
dential factors that should have been weighed by the Court. 
Courts must act responsibly if they seek to assume the tradi- 
tional legislative responsibility of weighing policy factors and de- 
termining which parties are entitled to judicial protection.loO Ac- 
cording to Powell, "weighting of relevant concerns," such as 
comity and separation of powers, must be made before deciding 
to infer a cause of action from the Constitution.lol The Davis 
dissenters were disturbed by the assessment of a money dam- 
ages remedy against a congressman, not by the nature of the 
remedy itself. The two-step Davis analysis ignored the broad 
policy implications of awarding such a remedy against a con- 
98. Id. 
99. See notes 63-64 and accompanying text supra. 
100. Justice Powell protested that "the decision of the Court today . . . avoids our 
obligation to take into account the range of policy and constitutional considerations that 
we would expect a legislature to ponder in determining whether a particular remedy 
should be enacted." 442 U.S. at 254-55 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 252-53. 
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gressman, and the 'legitimate interests of Members of Con- 
gress"lo2 in carefully avoiding the creation of a statutory cause of 
action were not taken into account. The Brennan approach does 
not allow for careful deliberation of all relevant policy factors 
that should be considered in the constitutional cause of action 
context. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Davis v. Passman was the first definitive Supreme Court 
ruling on the scope of the doctrine of implied constitutional 
causes of action since the doctrine's origin in Biuens. Davis for- 
mulated a two-part analysis of the propriety of implying causes 
of action from constitutional guarantees, separating the issues of 
a cause of action and the remedy for the cause of action. Apply- 
ing this analysis, the Court first declared its power to award a 
cause of action to hear the merits of Davis's constitutional claim, 
since there was no effective alternative means of enforcing the 
asserted constitutional right. Secondly, the Court concluded that 
the Constitution impliedly authorized the judiciary to award 
money damages for plaintiffs in Davis' situation without express 
congressional approval, as long as the circumstances were "ap- 
propriate" for granting the remedy. 
The Davis analysis is troubling because it limits the consid- 
eration of policy factors to the nature of the constitutional guar- 
antee asserted and the proper remedy to protect that interest. 
The dissenters in Davis forcefully argued for a more broadly- 
based analysis of all the factors related to the implication of a 
constitutional cause of action. Davis could be subject to congres- 
sional attack because it directly interferes with the indepen- 
dence of congressional decisionmaking. 
Douglas M. Monson 
102. Id. at 255. 
